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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2012 
______________ 
 
THE FIRST LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION 
 
v. 
 
PAUL MCGEEHAN; ROSANNE MCGEEHAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE;  
ADAM MCGEEHAN; LAURA MCGEEHAN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
          Appellants  
 
     ______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 1-16-cv-00199) 
District Judge: Hon. Susan Paradise Baxter 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 28, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 21, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 In November 2013, husband and wife Adam and Laura McGeehan were injured in 
a car accident, in a vehicle covered by Adam’s parents’ insurance.  The McGeehans 
claim that First Liberty Insurance Corporation owes them additional coverage for their 
injuries pursuant to their automobile insurance policies.  The McGeehans appeal the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of First Liberty.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s order.  
I 
 On a Thanksgiving weekend visit to Erie, Pennsylvania in 2013, Adam and Laura 
McGeehan were injured in an automobile accident.  The accident occurred blocks away 
from Adam’s parents’ house, where he and Laura were staying.  At the time, Adam and 
Laura lived together in Virginia and both worked there as teachers.  A few days prior, 
they had driven from Virginia to Erie in a 2004 Chevrolet Trailblazer, the vehicle 
involved in the accident, which was covered by Adam’s parents’ insurance policy.  
Adam’s parents, Paul and Rosanne McGeehan, had two insurance policies with First 
Liberty—a “Four-Vehicle Policy” and a “Lincoln Navigator Policy” (the Policies).  App. 
156, ¶ 2–3.  The Trailblazer was listed on the Four-Vehicle Policy, which included Adam 
as a driver. 
 The Four-Vehicle Policy includes an “Underinsured Motorists Coverage-
Pennsylvania (Stacked) Endorsement” (UIM Endorsement).  App. 526, ¶ 9.  This 
provision provides “stacked” coverage, whereby the $300,000 limit per vehicle can be 
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multiplied by up to four—because the policy covers four vehicles—providing up to $1.2 
million in potential coverage for injuries sustained in an accident.  First Liberty paid 
Adam and Laura the $300,000 bodily injury limit for the Trailblazer but refused to apply 
stacked coverage.  It also rejected their claim under the Lincoln Navigator Policy’s UIM 
Endorsement, which provides $300,000 in coverage. 
 First Liberty denied both stacked coverage under the Four-Vehicle Policy and 
coverage under the Lincoln Navigator Policy based on its determination that Adam and 
Laura were not “family members” of Paul and Rosanne, a designation required for the 
disputed coverage.  The parties’ dispute over whether Adam and Laura were “family 
members,” as defined by the Policies, is the issue on appeal.    
 On August 2, 2016, First Liberty initiated a declaratory judgment action in the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, asking the court to determine its 
responsibilities under the two Policies.  The McGeehans counterclaimed for the disputed 
insurance proceeds.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the 
District Court granted First Liberty’s motion for summary judgment and denied the 
McGeehans’ motion for partial summary judgment.  The Court found that Adam and 
Laura were not “family members” of Paul and Rosanne.  The McGeehans timely 
appealed. 
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II  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and its legal interpretation of contractual language de novo.  Viera v. 
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 418 (3d Cir. 2011).  We apply the same summary 
judgment standard as the District Court and will affirm summary judgment where, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A 
fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Id.  
The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs our analysis of the Policies’ language.   
 This case turns on whether Adam and Laura are “family members” of Paul and 
Rosanne, as defined by the Policies.  If Adam and Laura qualify as “family members,” 
First Liberty would owe them stacked benefits under the Four-Vehicle Policy and 
coverage for bodily injury under the Lincoln Navigator Policy.  Both Policies contain 
identical language limiting liability for bodily injury resulting from one accident: 
If “bodily injury” is sustained in an accident by you or any 
“family member”, our maximum limit of liability for all 
damages in any such accident is the sum of the limits of 
liability for Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the 
Schedule or in the Declarations applicable to each vehicle.  
Subject to the maximum limit of liability for all damages, the 
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most we will pay for “bodily injury” sustained by an 
“insured” other than you or any “family member” is the 
limit of liability shown in the Schedule or in the Declarations 
applicable to the vehicle the “insured” was “occupying” at the 
time of the accident. 
 
App. 54 (Four-Vehicle Policy) (emphasis added), 103 (Lincoln Navigator Policy) (same).  
Both Policies define “family member”  as “a person related to you by blood, marriage or 
adoption who is a resident of your household.”  App. 35 (Four-Vehicle Policy), 81 
(Lincoln Navigator Policy).   
A 
 First Liberty claims that Adam and Laura do not qualify as “family members” 
because they do not reside with Paul and Rosanne.  The McGeehans counter that the 
Policies’ definition of “family member” is ambiguous based on its use and omission of 
commas.  And their preferred interpretation is that relatives through “blood” or 
“marriage” automatically qualify as family members, regardless of where they live, while 
those related through “adoption” are only covered if they reside in the policyholders’ 
household.1 
 
1  The McGeehans also argue that First Liberty failed to include “facts regarding 
the issue of Adam and Laura McGeehan’s residency” in its “Concise Statement of 
Material Facts” before the District Court, in violation of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania’s Local Rule 56(b)(1).  Appellants’ Br. 25.  But because First Liberty filed 
a Concise Statement of Material Facts, and this rule does not require perfection in this 
regard, we do not find relief warranted on this basis.  See United States v. Eleven 
Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
district courts have discretion to “waive a requirement of its local rules in appropriate 
circumstances”). 
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 “Under Pennsylvania law, an insurance contract is ambiguous where it: ‘(1) is 
reasonably susceptible to different constructions, (2) is obscure in meaning through 
indefiniteness of expression, or (3) has a double meaning.’”  Viera, 642 F.3d at 419 
(quoting Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “Straightforward 
language in an insurance policy should be given its natural meaning.”  Lawson, 301 F.3d 
at 162.  Parties’ disagreement on the proper construction of a provision does not render it 
ambiguous.  Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 A.2d 550, 562 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2006).  Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to 
decide.  Id. at 561–62; Thomas Rigging & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Contraves, Inc., 798 A.2d 
753, 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).  We agree with the District Court’s well-reasoned 
conclusion that the Policies’ definition of “family member” is not ambiguous and 
requires that an insured individual, however related to the policyholders, reside in the 
policyholders’ household. 
 First, we reject the McGeehans’ argument that the “last antecedent rule” confirms 
the definition’s ambiguity and supports their reading of it.  “Th[is] rule provides ‘that 
qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase 
immediately preceding and not to others more remote.’”  Viera, 642 F.3d at 418 (quoting 
Stepnowski v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 456 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2006)).  This rule, 
however, is “not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of 
meaning.”  J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
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Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).  And “[w]here the meaning of the contract 
language is clear, the last-antecedent rule should not be used to create ambiguity.”  Viera, 
642 F.3d at 419.  When the words of the modifying phrase apply “as much to the first and 
other words as to the last,” the language plainly applies to all elements of the series.  
Midboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 1342, 1347 (Pa. 1981) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rosenbloom Fin. Corp., 325 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. 1974)).   
 As First Liberty points out, “[t]he clause ‘who is a resident of your household’ 
references the word ‘person,’ which in turn denominates a ‘[f]amily member.’”  
Appellee’s Br. 26.  Therefore, “who is a resident of your household” most naturally and 
unambiguously applies to all relations in the series.  In other words, as First Liberty 
rightly frames the analysis, the modifying phrase, “who is a resident of your household” 
cannot grammatically only modify the last antecedent, “adoption.”  Appellee’s Br. 26.  
We thus “refrain from torturing the language of a policy to create ambiguities where none 
exist.”  Pilosi, 393 F.3d at 363 (quoting McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 
922 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 We agree with the District Court that even assuming the McGeehans are correct—
that placing a comma after “marriage” and before “or adoption” and another comma after 
“adoption” and before “who is a resident” would clarify the definition’s meaning—“it 
does not necessarily follow that the language as presently written is ambiguous as a 
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matter of law.”  First Liberty Ins. Corp. v. McGeehan, 381 F. Supp. 3d 478, 483 (W.D. 
Pa. 2019). 
 We also reject the McGeehan’s “plausible rationale” for their interpretation—that 
“[r]equiring adopted family members to also reside in the insured’s household provides 
insurance carriers with an additional safeguard against potential exploitation of the 
otherwise laudable adoption process, aimed solely to provide coverage to an individual 
who might otherwise have no coverage, irrespective of any real closeness in 
relationship.”  Appellants’ Br. 20.  As noted by the District Court, “[i]t seems unlikely . . 
. that individuals will undertake the time-consuming and costly process of legal adoption 
– along with all of the potential ensuing expenses and responsibilities related to legal 
guardianship – merely for the hypothetical benefit of expanding the adoptee’s access to 
insurance benefits.”  McGeehan, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 485.  We also agree with the District 
Court’s analysis and conclusion that the McGeehans’ expert testimony is inadmissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because “questions of ambiguity or contractual 
meaning . . . are questions of law for th[e] Court to resolve.”  Id. 
 We thus will affirm the District Court’s holding that the Policies’ definition of 
“family member” is unambiguous and that all categories of people it describes must be 
residents of the policyholders’ household.   
B 
 Next, we must determine whether Adam and Laura were “residents” of Paul and 
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Rosanne’s household and thus “family members.”  The Policies do not define a 
“resident,” so we must look to Pennsylvania common law.  In Amica Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., the Pennsylvania Superior Court interpreted the 
word “resident” in a materially identical auto insurance provision.  545 A.2d 343, 344 n.1 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“‘[F]amily member’ means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster 
child.” (quoting auto insurance policy)).  In that case, the driver was a child of divorced 
parents, and the insurance policy belonged to her father.  Id. at 345.  During the relevant 
time period, she lived primarily with her mother, and her visits to her father’s house were 
“sporadic.”  Id.  She nonetheless kept “a closet or two full of clothes at her father’s house, 
approximately forty pairs of shoes, books, cosmetics, stuffed animals, tennis equipment, 
and a pet rabbit,” and she received mail there.  Id.  In prior years, she had spent more 
time at her father’s house, and she planned to live with him during the upcoming 
summer, before starting college.  Id. 
 The Superior Court interpreted “family member” to include only those “who 
actually reside in the household of the insured.”  Id. at 346.  It found that the child’s 
belongings were at her father’s house “for convenience and did not evidence that she 
physically lived there.”  Id.  The court held that “as a matter of physical fact,” the driver 
resided at her mother’s house at the time of the accident.  Id.; cf. Krager v. Foremost Ins. 
Co., 450 A.2d 736, 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (finding residency established under an 
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analogous policy where the plaintiff lived with his mother from April through November, 
including at the time of the accident).   
 Unlike a person’s domicile, which is a “matter of intention,” one’s residence is “a 
physical fact.”  Laird v. Laird, 421 A.2d 319, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).  Residency 
requires “at the minimum, some measure of permanency or habitual repetition.”  Wall 
Rose Mut. Ins. Co. v. Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 965 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Erie 
Ins. Exch. v. Weryha, 931 A.2d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)).  Here, the physical facts, 
as set forth by the parties and as evidenced by the record (including Adam and Laura’s 
deposition transcripts), do not demonstrate that Adam and Laura were “residents” of Paul 
and Rosanne’s household.  As in Amica, Adam’s past residency at the home, intended 
future visits, maintenance of many belongings, and receipt of mail do not establish 
residency.  See 545 A.2d at 345–46.  Nor do his and Laura’s periodic visits or other ties 
to the Erie area.  We thus will affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Adam and Laura 
are not “family members” under the Policies because they do not reside in Paul and 
Rosanne’s household. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of First Liberty.  
